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Abstract. Privacy preserving data publication is a major concern for both the
owners of data and the data publishers. Principles like k-anonymity, l-diversity were
proposed to reduce privacy violations. On the other side, no studies were found on
verification on the anonymized data in terms of adversarial breach and anonymity
levels. However, the anonymized data is still prone to attacks due to the presence of
dependencies among quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes. This paper presents
a novel framework to detect the existence of those dependencies and a solution
to reduce them. The advantages of our approach are i) privacy violations can be
detected, ii) the extent of privacy risk can be measured and iii) re-anonymization
can be done on vulnerable blocks of data. The work is further extended to show
how the adversarial breach knowledge eventually increased when new tuples are
added and an on the fly solution to reduce it is discussed. Experimental results are
reported and analyzed.
Keywords: Privacy, anonymized data, dependencies, Bayesian net, breach, verifi-
cation, publishing
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1 INTRODUCTION
A wide and enormous growth of information technology in terms of computation
and storage, has resulted in collection of large volumes of data by organizations and
vendors (Public/Private). This data is made available electronically over the inter-
net for several statistical, data mining, business intelligence and research analysis.
Such data may contain individual specific sensitive information for example disease,
credit card transaction, etc. When public voter registration list is combined with
the health insurance information records [37] the medical record of the governor of
Massachusetts has been potentially identified. This problem was termed as linking
attack [20]. Principles and frameworks for stronger privacy protection were devel-
oped. The k-anonymity is the first known technique to protect the privacy of data
by anonymizing it [37, 38]. The main idea of k-anonymity is to make the individuals
indistinguishable from others in the published table. This is achieved through gen-
eralization such that each individual’s tuple has to be same as at least (k− 1) other
tuples. The concept of generalization technique is to replace more specific value to
less specific value, for instance changing the value of age from 23 to [20–25].
Identifier Quasi-Identifier Sensitive Attribute
Name Age Gender Zipcode Government Marital-Status Salary
Alice 90 M 27000 Private Married > 50 K
Flynn 30 F 18000 State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Adam 83 M 26000 Self-emp Married ≤ 50 K
Jessica 32 F 13000 Federal-gov Married ≤ 50 K
Bob 51 M 58000 Private Married > 50 K
Calvin 65 M 24000 Private Divorced ≤ 50 K
June 41 F 23000 Private Divorced ≤ 50 K
Jane 32 F 16000 Local-gov Separated > 50 K
Scott 73 M 37000 Federal-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Lousy 50 F 22000 State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Table 1. Sample adult data
According to [7] the attributes in the dataset are classified as identifier1, quasi-
identifier (QI), sensitive attributes (S) and Non-Sensitive attributes (NSA). Let us
consider the census information in Table 1. Here the sensitive attributes are Gov-
ernment, Marital-status and Salary. These attributes are generally considered to be
private by the individual [37]. The attribute Name is termed as identifier because
one can easily identify the exact tuple by knowing the name of the individual. For
instance, it is clear that Flynn works in state-gov. The attributes Age, Sex, Zipcode
are termed as quasi-identifiers (QI) as these attributes when combined with external
dataset like voters registration list may result in potential leakage of the identity
of an individual. This identification is due to the presence of common attributes
1 Identifier sometimes is termed as explicit identifier
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among the datasets. Those attributes which do not fall into above three categories
are non-sensitive attributes.
Quasi-Identifier Sensitive Attribute
Age Gender Zipcode Government Marital-Status Salary
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] Federal-gov Married ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] Private Divorced ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] Local-gov Separated > 50 K
[51–90] M [24000–58000] Private Married > 50 K
[51–90] M [24000–58000] Self-emp Married ≤ 50 K
[51–90] M [24000–58000] Private Married > 50 K
[51–90] M [24000–58000] Private Divorced ≤ 50 K
[51–90] M [24000–58000] Federal-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Table 2. 5-anonymized adult data
1.1 Motivation and Our Contributions
Anonymity techniques proposed in the literature [32, 18, 19] observed that due
to the presence of dependencies among the attributes in an anonymized dataset
an individual can be identified with certain probability. In this section, we show how
the background knowledge of the adversary could possibly reveal the individual’s
identity in an anonymized data.
Consider an anonymized dataset as shown in Table 2. The anonymity level of
the dataset is k = 5. Here, an individual can be identified with a probability of at
most 1/5. If an adversary knows that Bob is male and he belongs to the second
anonymity-group then he can infer that the salary of Bob is > 50 K with probability
of 2/5, i.e. with 40 % likelihood. If an adversary possesses additional background
knowledge about Bob, that he works in a private organization one can say that the
marital status is Married and he earns salary of > 50 K with a probability of 1, i.e.
with 100 % likelihood, because the dependency “Private→ Married, > 50 K” holds
good even though the dataset is anonymized. This inference is termed as ‘quasi-
identifier to sensitive attributes’ dependency. The dependency attack is said to occur
with a probability called as breach probability. For a given scenario, dependency
is possible among attributes. Verifying a large dataset manually would be tedious
task. Moreover, to find the impact of these dependencies on privacy in the published
data is not known. The following research questions need to be answered.
(a) What could be the plausible types of dependencies that can exist among at-
tributes? How to determine the breach probability?
(b) How can we reduce these kind of dependencies?
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(c) How can we reduce the breach probability when new tuples are added in the
subsequent releases? Is there a limit?
Earlier versions of this work addressed the first two questions [32, 31]. [32] ad-
dressed the research question (a) i.e., how the dependencies in an anonymized data
can be determined. The conditional probabilities are found using belief network.
A belief network or Bayesian network is used to model a domain containing uncer-
tainty [6, 40]. The group of attributes which can identify an individual with highest
probability is found. The second research question (b) is addressed in [31]. Break-
Merge technique was used to reduce the dependencies. The link between QI and
S attributes is de-associated. It is observed that privacy risk increases when new
tuples are added in the next release. This paper overcomes this limitation and hence
addresses the third research question (c). An incremental Break-Merge technique
is proposed in this paper and the increase in privacy breach when new tuples are
added is discussed. In addition, the number of the tuples that must be added when
a breach threshold is known is also discussed in this paper.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the state of art in the
literature. Section 3 presents the architecture of the proposed technique. Section 4
discusses the proposed algorithm to find the dependencies among the attributes.
Section 5 presents an approach to eliminate the dependencies. A technique to reduce
privacy breach for an incremental data release is addressed in section 6. Section 7
presents our experimentation results, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Existing privacy techniques use generalization for anonymizing the data. Several
other frameworks like suppression [1], single-dimension generalization [4, 12, 15, 43,
47] and multiple domain generalization [13, 18, 19] are the different forms of general-
ization. In generalization the more specific value is replaced with less specific value
whereas in suppression the values are replaced with special characters like ‘?’, ‘*’,
etc. In single-dimension technique, every QI value is mapped to the corresponding
QI value in the other domain and in multiple domain generalization the QI val-
ues are mapped to the overlapped domains. Off-the-shelf softwares like SAS [33],
SPSS [34], STATA [35] implement suppression and single dimensional generalization
for their statistical analysis as they can be easily processed. These methods do not
provide enough information for classification. µ-Args [14] and datafly [36] also use
suppression and single-domain generalization techniques.
Statistical community limit their study to randomization techniques for resolving
re-identification problem [17]. They added noise to the data but their methods
could not provide a better effective solution and therefore lead to failure of data
integrity. Observing this data integrity failure researchers moved to generalization
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based techniques. [37] proposed the notion of k-anonymity to protect privacy of
an individual. However, the adversary knowledge on QI values easily re-identified
the individual when the data was combined with outside data. To overcome the
linking attack, generalization techniques were developed [38, 4, 2, 29]. Several other
techniques like l-diversity [21] were published to protect the inference on the sensitive
values. (α, k)-anonymity [43] is the combination of k-anonymity and l-diversity
principles. It protects both identification and sensitive information by reducing
the homogeneity attack. [46] discusses m-variance as a rigid version of l-diversity
which divides the group such that it has exactly m-sensitive values. (c, k)-safety [23]
assumes a stronger adversary background knowledge. If the attacker knows k pieces
of knowledge (c, k) safety guarantees the inference of sensitive values adhering to c-
confidence. t-closeness [20] and (k, e) anonymity [48] deal with only numerical data.
l-diversity and (α, k) anonymity handles categorical data. In addition to above, Xia
and Tao define personalized privacy [44] where the individual defines his/her own
degree of privacy. The primary motivation for this paper is that none of the above
works guarantee the claimed anonymization level for the given anonymized data.
Other important methods like anatomy [45], k-permutation [48], bucketiza-
tion [23], ambiguity [42] help in achieving better utility than generalization based
methods but publish the QI values directly. Publishing QI values directly may re-
identify the individual when the adversarial knowledge increases potentially [13].
Generalization, permutation and query-based anonymization techniques fail in dis-
covering the associations among the QI and S attributes. [41] proposed Q-S associ-
ation technique where they generate association and disassociation rules and then
generalize the sensitive values. They use inverted file data structure to construct
1-itemsets for determining the association rules effectively. This results in utility
loss. All the aforementioned frameworks and principles do not verify the privacy
leaks once the dataset is anonymized.
3 ARCHITECTURE OF THE PPDP VERIFICATION MODEL
The architecture of the Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) verification
model consists of the following four steps, as shown in Figure 1.
Step 1. Anonymizer: Anonymizer uses k-anonymity principle to anonymize the
data. This paper generates concept hierarchy tree based on attribute values for
a given domain. For example, the concept hierarchy tree for gender could be
generalized to person for male or female.
Step 2. Detecting Dependencies: In this step, the dependencies among the QI
and sensitive attributes are identified. The attribute dependencies are deter-
mined using a Bayesian graph.
Step 3. Break-Merge: To reduce the number of dependencies the dataset is split
into QI Tables and Sensitive Tables (ST) separately. This step limits the at-
tackers from inferring knowledge about sensitive data.
Verification in Privacy Preserving Data Publishing 1165
Figure 1. Verification model for privacy preserving data publishing
Step 4. Incremental Break-Merge: This is useful in preserving privacy in sub-
sequent releases of the data. Since the number of tuples vary from release to
release Break-Merge is repeated. Addition of new tuples is not permitted if
breach threshold condition is violated. This condition helps in determining the
limit on the number of tuples if addition of them can make the data vulnerable
to privacy attack. If there are no dependencies the anonymized dataset can be
published as it is.
The key focus of this paper is to detect attribute dependencies in the context of
privacy. Once the dependencies are identified Break-Merge technique is applied to
reduce them. However, Break-Merge is useful only for a static release of the data.
When new tuples are added for the next release, Incremental Break-Merge is applied
to detect dependencies and a suggestion on the threshold, number of tuples that can
be added while preserving of the privacy is made. The following sections discuss in
detail the proposed verification techniques.
4 DETECTING DEPENDENCIES
The problem of attribute dependencies is modelled using Bayesian network. The
Bayesian network (BN) [26] represents a high-level probability distribution on a set
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of variables to represent a model on the problem domain given a hypothesis. The
parent-child relationship between nodes in a Bayesian network indicates the direction
of causality between the corresponding variables. In this paper, the attribute is
treated as the node in the Bayesian network.
Definition 1 (Breach Probability)). Let A= {A1, A2, . . . , An} be the set of QI and
S attributes of an anonymized data set D′, ti = {ti.A1, ti.A2, . . . , ti.An} be a tuple,
where ti.Aj represents the value of the tuple ti in the possible domain of Aj∀j = 1
to n. Let Πj be the set of parents of Aj in G. Then the breach probability (BP)
for revealing a tuple ti.Aj known its parents tj is equal to the Bayesian probability
(PBN) of Aj given Πj. Formally we define it as follows:
BP (ti.Aj/πj) = PBN(ti.Aj/πj). (1)
However, in some cases the entire tuple ti will be revealed. Now the discrete
conditional probability distribution is defined as the product of probabilities of Aj
given over Πj. Formally it is given as







where H(ti.Aj) is a hypothesis define on ti.Aj. For example the hypothesis could be
knowing the values of Age as [20–30]. From (2) it is clear that if πi = {∅}, i.e., Aj has
no parents, the distribution is unconditional else it is conditional distribution. The
distribution is calculated in terms of conditional probabilities. Once the Bayesian
network is constructed CPT for each node is calculated.
In purview of privacy the following three cases of attribute dependencies may
arise.
• The dependencies among quasi-identifiers,
• The dependencies among sensitive attributes and
• The dependencies between quasi identifiers and sensitive attributes.
The following sections discuss each of the cases. The anonymized table (Table 2)
is used as an example throughout this paper.
4.1 Dependencies Among Quasi Identifiers
To show the attribute dependency levels among quasi-identifiers a Bayes network
is constructed as shown in the Figure 2. The following attribute dependencies are
drawn.
• Age is an independent attribute and has no parents.
• Age→ Zipcode (Zipcode is dependent on Age)
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Figure 2. Bayesian net for quasi-identifiers
• AgeZipcode→ Gender (Gender is dependent on both Age and Zipcode)
For two attributes the CPT is given as
CPT (Attribute1 = X → Attribute2 = Y )
=
Count(Attribute1 = x) + Count(Attribute2 = y)
Count(Attribute2 = y)
For the attribute pair Age, Zipcode the CPT(Age = (30–50) → Zipcode =
(13000–23000)) = [5/5] = 1. Similarly the remaining values are calculated. The
corresponding CPT for the dependency ZipcodeAge → Gender has been shown in
Table 3.
It can be seen in CPT(Age, Zipcode) in Table 3 that the probability of revealing
that the age is in the range 30–50 is 100 % when the adversary knows the zipcode is
in the range of 13000–23000. If the adversary knows the zipcode and also age values
the probability of finding whether gender is “F” is 1. In this way the dependencies
Age→ Gender, Age→ Zipcode, Zipcode→ Gender and ZipcodeAge→ Gender are
found. However, which dependencies hold good are determined based on the risk
level (α). The (α) value will be varied based on the privacy requirements of the
data publisher. For example, if the publisher considers the α value is in between





[13000–23000] [30–50] 1 0
[13000–23000] [51–90] 0.5 0.5
[24000–58000] [30–50] 0.5 0.5
[24000–58000] [51–90] 0 1
Table 3. CPT for AgeZipcode→ Gender dependency
The dependencies among sensitive attributes follows the quasi-identifiers detec-
tion process.
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4.2 Dependencies Among Quasi-Identifiers and Sensitive Attributes
Bayesian network on the whole anonymized dataset of Table 2 is shown in Figure 3.
Due to the additional background information the adversary may predict by examin-
ing the dependencies using a belief network. For example, the government attribute
is dependent on the remaining attributes. When the CPT table is checked for the
dependency, as given in Figure 4, it can be clearly observed that when the adver-
sary knows the QI value and Marital-Status is Never-Married and earns a Salary
≤ 50 K. One can conclude that the individual works in State-gov with likelihood
of 100 %. Other combinations also potentially leak the government adversary with
complete likelihood. Hence the dependency {Age, Sex, Zipcode, Marital-Status,
Salary→ Government} holds well in the anonymized dataset.
The Algorithm for detecting the dependencies is explained in [32]. To reduce
these dependencies [31] proposed a technique Break-Merge which is discussed in
Section 5.
Figure 3. Bayesian net for the anonymized table
Figure 4. CPT for Age, Sex, Zipcode, Marital-Status, Salary→ Government dependency
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5 BREAK-MERGE
The earlier section discussed the presence of attribute dependencies and how one
can identify an individual thus violating individual privacy. Earlier versions of this
paper proposed Break-Merge [31] technique to reduce the attackers inferring nature.
Break-Merge splits the anonymized dataset into quasi-identifier (QI) table and sen-
sitive tables (ST’s). The QI table is represented in the form of (QI-Attributes
value, GID) and the Sensitive tables in the form of (GID, SA, Count) where GID
is the group id of the corresponding QI group, SA is the sensitive attribute value
and count is the number of times the sensitive value present in the correspond-
ing GID groups, respectively. For example, when we consider the Government
ST, it signifies that the value Sate-Gov is associated with two tuples in the first
QI-group, Federal-gov is associated with one tuple in the first group and one tu-
ple in the second QI-group. In this way all the sensitive tables are constructed.
Here the QI table does not hold any sensitive information and all the values in
the QI are generalized using k-anonymity. Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 show QI and ST
tables.
Age Sex Zipcode GID
[30–50] F [13000–23000] 1
[30–50] F [13000–23000] 1
[30–50] F [13000–23000] 1
[30–50] F [13000–23000] 1
[30–50] F [13000–23000] 1
[51–90] M [24000–58000] 2
[51–90] M [24000–58000] 2
[51–90] M [24000–58000] 2
[51–90] M [24000–58000] 2
[51–90] M [24000–58000] 2










Since this technique clearly detaches the links between quasi-identifier and sen-
sitive attributes the adversary cannot clearly infer any sort of dependencies between
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GID Salary Count
1 ≤ 50 K 4
1 > 50 K 1
2 ≤ 50 K 3











QI and S attributes because the QI table does not hold any sensitive informa-
tion and if needed must be obtained from the ST tables. This will reduce the
adversary inferring nature even though he/she possesses information of an individ-
ual because the probability for inferring the sensitive value will increase gradually.
For instance, let us consider that the adversary knows the age of Bob is 51 and
zipcode is 58000 (Tuple id 5 as shown in the Table 1). Since the values in the
QI tables are generalized if the adversary wants to know the salary of Bob the
only way to guess is through group id i.e., 2, since all the males fall in the sec-
ond group. With the help of the group id when he looks for ST it is clear that
out of 5 records, 3 males are drawing the salary ≤ 50 K and 2 male are drawing
a salary of > 50 K and hence the probability that the salary of Bob is either 3/5
or 2/5.
Government Marital-Status Salary Probability Likelihood
State-Gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K 25 ∗
4
5 32 %
State-Gov Never-Married > 50 K 25 ∗
1
5 8 %
State-Gov Married ≤ 50 K 15 ∗
4
5 16 %
State-Gov Married > 50 K 15 ∗
1
5 4 %
State-Gov Divorced ≤ 50 K 15 ∗
4
5 16 %
State-Gov Divorced > 50 K 15 ∗
1
5 4 %
State-Gov Separated ≤ 50 K 15 ∗
4
5 16 %
State-Gov Separated > 50 K 15 ∗
1
5 4 %
Table 8. Knowledge breach probability
However, if the adversary gathers much hypothetical information about Bob, let
us say, that he works in a private firm and the adversary wants to know the marital-
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status and salary of Bob, the probability that Bob is married and his salary is ≥50 K
is 2/5 ∗ 3/5 = 6/25, i.e. 24 % likelihood. This example shows that if the adversary
has sufficient knowledge on quasi-identifier and one of the sensitive attribute, the
likelihood to infer the remaining sensitive values is reduced considerably. Table 8
presents the likelihood for one combination.
Definition 2. Given QI table and STs with n attributes, the group id GIDl , the
sensitive attribute SA, the breach probability of an individual when the adversary
knows the target individual group id is as follows:










where t.[] represents the tuple under all the attributes of the QI table and STs,
t.[An+1] represents the (n+ 1)
th attribute instance and |SA| is the number of sensi-
tive attributes and |cjm| is the count of the corresponding sensitive value.
Definition 3. Given QI table and STs having n attributes, the group id GIDl , the
sensitive attribute SA, the breach probability of an individual when the adversary
knows only one sensitive attribute value sjm, i.e. t[SAm] = s
j
m after reconstructing
QI table and STs, is as follows:
BP
[






Definition 4. Given QI table and STs having n attributes, the group id GIDl and
the sensitive attribute SA, the breach probability of an individual when the adversary
knows the group id and one of the sensitive attribute value sjm, i.e. t[SAm] = s
j
m of
the target individual after reconstructing, is given by:
BP
[












Based on the Definitions 2, 3 and 4 different lemmas and properties are derived.
The definitions and detailed proofs of these are given in [32].
5.1 Break-Merge Algorithm
The algorithm Break-Merge is shown in the Algorithm 2. The algorithm has two
phases: Assignment of group id and decoupling of the anonymized dataset D′. Dur-
ing the first phase the group id is assigned to D′ (steps 2–9). First, each tuple in
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Algorithm 2: Break-Merge
Input: An Anonymized Dataset (D
′
)
Output: QItable and Stables (STs)
Assumptions:
QItable = φ
Stables = {Stable1 , Stable2 , . . . , Stablem} = φ,
AT ′ = φ, Gcnt = 1;
QSeti = {QSet1 , QSet2 , . . . , QSetd};
SSetj = {SSet1 , SSet2 , . . . , SSetm};
1 Begin
2 For each Tuple Ti in D
′
3 If(QSeti == QSeti+1) then
4 Insert tuple (QSeti , Gcnt, SSeti) into AT
′
5 Else
6 Insert tuple (QSeti , Gcnt, SSeti) into AT
′
7 Gcnt = Gcnt + 1;
8 End If
9 End For
10 For i = 1 to Gcnt
11 For each tuple tj in AT
′
i
12 Insert tuple(QSetj , i) into Qtable;
13 End For
14 End For
15 For each Sk in SSet{Sset1 , Sset2,...,Ssetm}
16 For each distinct Sk value v in AT
′
i
17 support ij (v)=The number of records in
ADT ∗i with sensitive value v;




the Quasi group is compared with the (n+ 1)th tuple in the group and if they are
equal, i.e. the same equivalence class, common group id is assigned. These steps
are repeated for all the tuples in the anonymized data to form QI partitions with
their corresponding group-ids. During the second phase the anonymized data is
divided into Q-table and sensitive tables (STs). For each tuple tj in AT
′
i the tu-
ples are inserted into QItable which contains only the QI group associated with its
corresponding group id having the form (QSetj , i) (step 11) and when coming to
the sensitive tables for each Quasi group the corresponding sensitive values count
is calculated and then inserted into sensitive table in the form of (QID, sensitive
value (v), count) (step 11–14).
Verification in Privacy Preserving Data Publishing 1173
Finally when the QItable, STs are formed and if the adversary wants to know
about any particular individual he/she can reconstruct a tuple by merging QI and
sensitive tables using simple natural join.
5.2 Limitations of Break-Merge
Break-Merge cannot identify breach probabilities when new tuples are added for the
next release. In view of this following research questions could be raised.
• How many tuples must be added to the dataset such that privacy breach will
not occur in the new release?
• Is there any threshold defined for the breach probability?
• Can we estimate the incremental ratio of the breach probability due to addition
of new tuples?
The above research questions are dealt in the next section.
6 INCREMENTAL BREAK-MERGE
In this section, we extended the Break-Merge approach where the possibility of
adding new tuples are ready for a new release of the dataset. We assume that the
new dataset contains the same attributes as in the old release. In this paper, we do
not consider the scenario of continuous data streams publishing (for example: credit
card transactions) in which the timestamp of the new stream is considered and then
anonymized accordingly.
Identifier Quasi-Identifier Sensitive Attribute
Name Age Sex Zipcode Government Marital-Status Salary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anne 42 F 17026 State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Abby 39 F 13834 State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Nancy 47 F 18002 State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Mary 50 F 23046 State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Mari 33 F 16523 State-gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
Lindy 34 F 22000 State-gov Never-Married > 50 K
Emma 41 F 23000 State-gov Never-Married > 50 K
Madison 32 F 16000 State-gov Never-Married > 50 K
Sarah 73 F 19000 State-gov Never-Married > 50 K
Grace 50 F 22000 State-gov Never-Married > 50 K
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 9. TIncremental dataset
When new tuples are added to the original dataset as shown in the Table 9 the
new dataset will be incremented. The whole dataset is re-anonymized accordingly.
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Age Sex Zipcode Government Marital-Status Salary
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married ≤ 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married > 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married > 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married > 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married > 50 K
[30–50] F [13000–23000] State-Gov Never-Married > 50 K
Table 10. Tincremental anonymized tuples
Table 10 shows the newly anonymized tuples only. Due to space limit and for
clear explanation we only considered two combinations, i.e., 5 females each who
are working in state-gov and whose marital-status is never married and salary may
be either ≤ 50 K or > 50 K. Since we apply Break-Merge technique and break
the dataset into QI and S tables the newly populated tables have new incremental
counts of the corresponding sensitive values accordingly as shown in the Tables 11,
12 and 13.
Since the counts of the sensitive attributes have changed the likelihood has
been re-calculated and shown in Table 14. It has been clearly observed that when
the new tuples are added to the previous dataset the probabilities have been in-
creased drastically. Due to space limit we tabulated few combinations and their
likelihoods. This strengthens the adversary knowledge breach in identifying the in-
dividual. In order to limit the attackers breach probability the data publisher allows
the addition of new tuples to the dataset until a desired risk level α is reached as
defined earlier Property 3: The knowledge breach probability for the new incre-
mental dataset TIncremental will be greater than the knowledge breach probability of




|GIDl |XX[SAi = v
j










6.1 Incremental Break-Merge Algorithm
The algorithm for incremental Break-Merge algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.
This algorithm takes the new incremental dataset IncT(DS*), the quasi identifier
table (QI) and the sensitive tables (ST’s) that were generated by the Break-Merge









Table 11. TIncremental sensitive table of Marital-Status
GID Salary Count
1 ≤ 50 K 9
1 > 50 K 6
2 ≤ 50 K 3
2 > 50 K 2
Table 12. TIncremental of Salary
algorithm as inputs. The algorithm updates the counts of the QIT and ST’s as
follows. Initially for each new tuple the breach probability is calculated (lines 2–4)
and Break-Merge principle is applied. The new breach probability is verified for the
defined breach probability limit α (line 5). Once this limit is reached no new tuples
are further allowed. The number of records that are allowable is returned along with
new incremental QI table and ST’s.
6.2 Analysis of Incremental Break-Merge
As discussed earlier the Break-Merge technique provides an optimal solution for
reducing the dependencies in an anonymized dataset. However, this technique has
its own limitation as discussed in Section 5.3. In this section an analysis is done to
show how the incremental breach probabilities vary while new tuples are added to









Table 13. TIncremental of Government
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Algorithm 3: Incremental Break-Merge
Input: Inc(D′), QItable and Stables(STs)
Output: IncQtable, IncSTs, support(v)
Assumptions:
IncQtable = φ,
IncST = {IncST1, IncST2, . . . , IncSTm} = φ,
QSeti = {QSet1 , QSet2 , . . . , QSetd};
SSetj = {SSet1 , SSet2 , . . . , SSetm};
1 Begin
2 For each Tuple Ti in Inc(D
′)
3 kbp = 1
4 For j = 1 to |IncST |
5 kbp = kbp *
countj
Gcntj




// The Permitted number of
records with sensitive value v
10 End
Different alpha values, let us say 0.6, 0.7, 0.87, 0.9, are considered for different
tuples ranging from 10 to 200. It can be easily observed that the data publisher
can assess for the defined risk level of the publisher and can determine for which
number of tuples the risk level exceeds. For instance when you see Figure 15 a)
(Section 7, Phase III) the risk level is set to 0.6 and maximum number of tuples
that can be added to the dataset are 17. If the number of tuples exceeds the breach
probability increases drastically. We varied the number of tuples from 10 to 200 for
different risk levels. When more than 190 tuples are added the risk level reaches
0.9 which shows a very high vulnerable breach Figure 15 d). This technique lever-
ages the data publisher for making decisions on the release of the dataset. We also
showed how much was the probability increased when different combinations of new
tuples were added to the older release. Table 14 shows Incremental ratio for various
combinations of dependencies. For instance when you see the dependency combi-
nation State-gov → NeverMarried (NM) and Salary > 50 K the breach probability
increased 3 times when 19 new tuples are added to the new release. This identi-
fication will help the data publisher to determine the number of tuples that must
be added and the addition of tuples can be restricted until the desired threshold
α is reached. Figures 11, 12, 13 and 14 show the probabilities increase for various
different combinations.
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Gov MS Salary Prob Like ProbInc LikeInc IncRatio






23 50 % 0.5625






23 32 % 3






25 50 % 0.5625






25 34 % 3.25






35 51 % 0.593






35 34 % 3.25






45 52 % 0.625






45 35 % 3.375






7 37 % 1.3125






7 6 % 0.5






13 41 % 1.562






13 12 % 2.5






20 41 % 2.43






20 14 % 2.75






37 55 % 0.625






37 15 % 0.75






9 26 % 1.25






9 7 % 1.75






13 36 % 1.25






13 11 % 1.75






24 41 % 1.56






24 17 % 3.25






37 42 % 1.625






37 18 % 3.5
Table 14. Knowledge breach probability
7 EXPERIMENTATION
Experimentations are conducted in three phases. In the first phase, the scalability is
measured for constructing the Bayesian networks. In the second phase experiments
were conducted for Break-Merge technique for scalability performances on different
real world and synthetic datasets. A comparison analysis is also performed with [41].
In Phase III we show how the knowledge breach probabilities increase with the
increment of new records for different risk values defined by the data publisher as
explained in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
7.1 Phase I
Experiments were conducted on Adult dataset available at UCI machine Learning
Repository [39]. The dataset consists of 14 attributes and 48 842 tuples. The final
dataset consists of 30 162 tuples after removing the missing values “?”. Out of
14 attributes age, sex and zipcode were treated as quasi-identifiers and government,
marital-status and salary were treated as sensitive attributes. Weka tool was used to
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construct the Bayesian net [6]. Experiments were conducted on both single sensitive
attributes and multiple sensitive attributes. The dataset is replicated such that each
equivalence size is 1 000. For the construction of Bayesian network it took less than
1.2 secs and nearly 1.7 secs for single and multiple sensitive attributes respectively
(Figures 5 and 6) for a dataset with 100 000 records.














Figure 5. Time taken for constructing Bayesian net for dataset with single sensitive at-
tribute















Figure 6. Time taken for constructing Bayesian net for dataset with three sensitive at-
tributes
7.2 Phase II
The experimental setup for Break-Merge technique is the same as in Phase I. The
Break-Merge algorithm was implemented in Java 1.7 using Netbeans 7.0 IDE. A com-
parison study was made with [41]. They construct 1-itemset to determine the pres-
ence of associations between quasi-identifier and sensitive attributes. They construct
the rules until they reach the certain threshold. Once the rules were obtained the
corresponding sensitive attributes were generalized accordingly. However, our ap-
proach does not generalize the sensitive attributes instead breaks the table into QI
and Sensitive tables as explained in Section 4.
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Figure 7. Comparison between Q-S association and BM

















Figure 8. Breaking time for Adult dataset
















Figure 9. Breaking time for Disease dataset
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Figure 10. Breaking time for Salary dataset
This increases the utility of the dataset for deriving useful patterns. Figure 7
shows that if the probability of the attacker increases above 50 % the sensitive at-
tributes are generalized to a high level and thereafter remain in that high level in
Q-S association, but our approach does not generalize the sensitive attributes and
the information loss with respect to the sensitive attributes will be zero. Different
performance measures for breaking the tables into real time adult dataset and syn-
thetic dataset that are generated from the Adult dataset were done. It took less
than 5 seconds to break the Adult dataset that contains 100 000 records, as shown in
Figure 8. The remaining datasets Disease and Salary also took less than 5 seconds,

















Figure 11. Comparison between Break-Merge and Incremental Break-Merge breach prob-
abilities
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Figure 12. Comparison between Break-Merge and Incremental Break-Merge breach prob-
abilities
















Figure 13. Comparison between Break-Merge and Incremental Break-Merge breach prob-
abilities
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this current internet era especially in information dissemination sectors, Pri-
vacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) has become an interesting and challenging
problem to deal with. Much of the research focused on anonymizing the data using
different frameworks and principles. But, the focus on verifying the data once it
is published is very trivial. The publisher is releasing the anonymized data with-
out any prior verification of how the adversary could identify an individual with
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Figure 14. Comparison between Break-Merge and Incremental Break-Merge breach prob-
abilities
his background knowledge and thereby compromising the privacy. In this paper,
we presented and discussed different folds of verification techniques on the pub-
lished data. We unfolded and contributed various solutions to achieve the following
objectives:
• To detect dependencies among quasi-identifiers and Sensitive attributes and de-
termine the breach probability
• To reduce the identified dependencies
• To identify breach probability for every incremental release and
• To determine the limit on the addition of new data tuples for every new release.
Our first contribution: we identified dependencies in an anonymized dataset by
constructing belief networks on different possibilities of the attributes. Our analysis
showed how many breach possibilities can be caused by an attacker when he/she
possesses hypothetical information of an individual. We further showed how the
data publisher can understand the nature of those vulnerable records by observing
the breach probability based on the defined threshold.
Secondly, we presented how these dependencies can be reduced by our proposed
verification model. In our model, the Break-Merge approach reduces the knowledge
breach. It simply decouples the anonymized dataset into Quasi table and Sensi-
tive tables. The main principle it follows is that no direct link exists between the
generalized group and the sensitive values. Here the sensitive values are not gen-
eralized or suppressed as done in Q-S associations technique. This enhances our
proposed technique by showing how the breach probability was increasing dras-
tically for different risk levels and it also gives a better utility during data min-
ing.
Finally, when subsequent release of data is considered we showed how Break-
Merge limits in not analyzing the new data that may reveal the dataset to attack.
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16(d): IBP for α=0.9








16(c): IBP for α=0.87
Figure 15. Incremental knowledge breach probability
Our new technique Incremental Break-Merge is a refined Break-Merge technique
where the verification is done by adding each tuple and then repeatedly checked un-
til the desired threshold is arrived. This signifies to what level and what amount of
data must be added to reduce the risk levels considerably. When once the de-
sired threshold is reached we stop adding new records. A comparison is made
between Break-Merge and Incremental Break-Merge to show how the likelihood
increases reasonably high when adding new records. To our knowledge, our ver-
ification techniques are first of the kind in the literature. We limited our study
only for different static releases of data. In future we need to further investi-
1184 S. V. Nadimpalli, V. K. Vatsavayi
gate how the nature of the likelihood may change in the dynamic release of the
data.
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